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C RIMINAL prosecutions of large organizations exhibit a
unique power dynamic. The target organizations include goli-
aths-some of the largest corporations in the United States, includ-
ing AIG, America Online, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Computer
Associates, HealthSouth, KPMG, MCI, Merrill Lynch & Co., and
Monsanto. A U.S. Attorney's office with its limited resources may
look like a tiny David by comparison. But prosecutors have their
slingshot: they wield the threat of an indictment, which results in
potentially catastrophic collateral and reputational consequences
to a corporation. Yet it is a threat that prosecutors can ill afford to
carry out due to those consequences. The detente resulting from
the collision of those oversized forces has taken a surprising turn,
perhaps because there was nowhere else to turn-from criminal
prosecution towards structural reform. By that I mean that prose-
cutors adopted a strategy to avoid an indictment and a conviction
by entering into detailed compliance agreements with organiza-
tions. In one example of a demanding structural reform agreement,
KPMG International, charged with marketing illegal private tax
shelters, agreed to shut down its private tax practice, to cooperate
fully in criminal investigations of former employees, and to hire an
independent monitor for three years to implement an elaborate
compliance program.
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In my piece, "Structural Reform Prosecution,"1 I present a pic-
ture of why and how federal prosecutors now enter into such
agreements supervising the rehabilitation of these goliath organiza-
tions. The Article examines the agreements' origins, goals, terms,
and the broader legal and institutional setting, including through
empirical analysis of the agreements entered after the Department
of Justice ("DOJ") announced its new approach in January 2003.2
While hue and cry over organizational prosecutions have focused
on privilege waiver and employer payment of attorney fees, those
two issues just scratch the surface of the complex problems that
these massive efforts raise. I hope here to draw attention first to a
series of problems raised by how these agreements define compli-
ance and second to the multi-polar context in which these agree-
ments are entered. "Structural Reform Prosecution" concludes by
posing questions for future work. I expand on that discussion here
by proposing reforms that, from different perspectives, address
some of the difficult issues that these agreements raise.
1. DEFINING ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLIANCE
Agreements between large organizations and prosecutors are
very different from the typical deferral agreement in which a per-
son agrees to refrain from any additional offenses for a period of
time and perhaps to enter into a rehabilitative program. Instead, I
have argued that these agreements should be viewed as structural
reform efforts, designed to prevent future criminality among the
members of a complex entity.
The first respect in which these agreements resemble classic civil
structural reform efforts is that they seek to reform entire institu-
tions. Many of these agreements carefully describe institution-wide
goals. For example, the KPMG agreement details the changes to
be made to KPMG's tax program and specifies an elaborate com-
pliance program.' The terms of compliance in such agreements are
fairly clear, as is a core understanding of what sort of criminality
the agreement is intended to prevent from recurring. The agree-
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'See id. at 938-57 (summarizing the terms of the agreements entered since January
2003).
'KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, August 26, 2005, available at
http://www.usdoj .gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf.
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ments also rely on many of the same tools that commonly appear
in civil structural reform cases: independent monitors tasked with
overseeing reforms, detailed injunctive provisions, and reporting
and auditing requirements to assess progress towards compliance.
As in civil efforts, these agreements also envision a rehabilitative
process lasting for some time, and therefore, also as in civil cases,
one can imagine their compliance goals shifting over time. There
will be some uncertainty in any such ongoing reform effort, given
broad terms due to a need for flexibility should the compliance
process itself uncover new problems. Unlike civil structural reform
efforts (and unlike earlier prosecutorial settlements of labor rack-
eteering cases in the 1980s), these efforts are largely non-public.
This poses a difficulty for outsiders in assessing how compliance
was defined during the implementation of any particular case. In
most cases all we have is the text of the agreement, with no infor-
mation regarding the subsequent implementation. Perhaps over
time more information will emerge regarding the successes and
failures in achieving the sought-after compliance.
Cooperation requirements included in many agreements appear
to last in perpetuity. How long does the KPMG agreement last?
Like many of the others, the KPMG agreement extended for three
years and has now terminated (with two additional years of IRS
supervision, during which time the DOJ may still terminate). Yet
KPMG also agreed to a series of "permanent restrictions and ele-
vated standards for its tax practice."4 Nor may KPMG ever make
statements contradicting the representations in the Agreement, in-
cluding in civil litigation. Nor may KPMG cease "its continuing co-
operation" with the DOJ's ongoing criminal investigations, "even
after the dismissal of the Information," and with any other prose-
cution or agency action "relating to or arising out of the conduct."'
Other agreements have still broader language regarding an obliga-
tion to cooperate. For example, Roger Williams Medical Center
agreed to "cooperate fully and actively with the [United States At-
torney's Office for the District of Rhode Island ("USAO-RI")],
and with any other government agency designated by the USAO-
RI... regarding any matter being investigated by the govern-
'Id. at 6.
5 Id. at 9[ 8-9.
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ment... about which RWMC has knowledge or information."'
These terms suggest that compliance in the form of cooperation
with government investigations may last into the indefinite future
regarding a broad array of matters of indefinite scope.
In addition to the important similarities, structural reform takes
on a different form in criminal law than in civil law, particularly
when implemented at the charging stage, due to the unique power
dynamic of an organizational prosecution. These agreements,
though often subject to court-approval, are supervised not by a
court, but by prosecutors. Prosecutors lack palatable alternatives to
structural reform. They cannot easily decline to prosecute the most
serious organizational crime cases, but nor can they abide the col-
lateral consequences of seeking convictions in all such cases. Upon
entering into settlement negotiations, however, prosecutors will
typically have enormous negotiating leverage by threatening the
"nuclear" option of an indictment, and it shows in the terms of the
agreements. For example, in most of these agreements, the DOJ
retains its enormous stick throughout the term of the agreement by
retaining the unilateral authority to find a breach and then prose-
cute. Though few agreements say anything about what the DOJ
can count as a breach, courts may not be able to remedy effectively
an arbitrary declaration of breach unless they provide pre-
indictment relief.
In some cases, that power dynamic may undermine the goal of
achieving compliance. Illustrative of the often serious conse-
quences of an organizational prosecution-even where the organi-
zation settles-is a recent nonprosecution agreement (entered in
March 2007, after my Article's study period of January 2003
through January 2007) with the Dallas law firm Jenkins & Gilchrist
regarding the same tax shelters at issue in the KPMG prosecu-
tions.' The agreement was far simpler than the others. It required
cooperation in the ongoing investigation, privilege waiver, and
noted a fine ($76 million) paid to the IRS. It did not include com-
6Deferred Prosecution Agreement at [ 7, U.S. v. Roger Williams Med. Ctr., No. 06-02T
(D.R.I. 2006), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/06/18/
rwmcagmt.pdf.
7 Id. at s 12.
See Ameet Sachdev, Firm Admits Selling Bogus Tax Shelters, Jenkens & Gilchrist
Closes Chicago Office, Dallas HQ, Chi. Trib., Mar. 30, 2007, at 1.
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pliance. Instead, the agreement noted that the firm planned to
close its doors.9 Though part of the reason the firm voted to dis-
solve was due to settlements in civil suits, it was also significant that
most of the firm's attorneys left during the ongoing criminal inves-
tigation of the firm's tax group."' This example shows how even an
investigation ending in a settlement can result in a catastrophic re-
sult for the entity, perhaps justifiably to deter future wrongdoing,
but also not so different from the result had the firm been indicted
and been convicted. An IRS Commissioner commented, "This
should be a lesson to all tax professionals that they must not aid or
abet tax evasion."" That sort of punitive goal was at odds with the
rehabilitative purpose of these agreements; if the goal was to teach
a lesson, then why not indict? The reason for settling seemed
chiefly to secure cooperation in individual prosecutions. The
agreement thus highlighted not only the power prosecutors may
wield, but also how the structural reform goals that ostensibly ani-
mate these agreements can fall by the wayside, resulting not in a
structural reform agreement but rather a cooperation agreement. 2
2. MULTI-POLAR PROSECUTIONS
A multi-polar dynamic created these prosecution agreements, as
in classic public law adjudication. State prosecutors, the Sentencing
Commission, regulatory agencies, compliance experts, industry,
and federal prosecutors each developed parallel approaches to-
ward organizational compliance. Which structural reformer came
'See Letter from Michael J. Garcia, United States Attorney, Southern District of New
York, to Robert B. Fiske, Jr. & James P. Rouhandeh, Davis Polk & Wardwell (Mar. 26,
2007), available at
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/06/18/jenkens-gilchrist.pdf.
'0 See Sachdev, supra note 8, at 1 ("The firm settled the civil suits in 2005 for $81.6
million, but the harm to the firm's reputation was greater than the financial pain.
About two-thirds of its more than 600 lawyers have left since 2001.").
" Terry Maxon, Jenkens & Gilchrist Closing After Admitting Role in Tax Fraud:
Dallas Firm to Pay IRS $76 Million, Aid in Investigation of Shelters, Dallas Morning
News, Mar. 30, 2007, at lA.
"The experience of Sidley Austin LLP shows how context specific the effects of a
nonprosecution agreement may be. Sidley was investigated for providing legal opin-
ion letters on KPMG-marketed tax shelters, and like the Jenkens firm, it also entered
into a nonprosecution agreement. Yet unlike the Jenkens firm, Sidley did not suffer
dire consequences, perhaps because only one partner was involved in the conduct and
while at a firm that later merged with Sidley. See Lynnley Browning, Court Ruling
Jeopardizes U.S. Tax Case, N.Y. Times, May 24, 2007, at Cl.
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first is hard to say. If the DOJ decided to stop entering into these
agreements by instructing all of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices not to
defer prosecution in this way, similar agreements would still be en-
tered in large numbers and in many of the same cases by regula-
tors.
First, several regulators may be involved in negotiating any one
structural reform agreement. Federal prosecutors often take only
egregious cases referred by regulatory agencies, which retain an
important role in subsequent negotiations and implementation.
This follows where a raft of regulatory agencies have sought to ac-
complish similar goals through voluntary disclosure regimes or
consent decrees for decades. For example, the SEC's Seaboard
Report looks very much like the DOJ's Thompson and McNulty
Memos.1 Nothing could be more standard practice than granting
organizations cooperation credit and encouraging self-investigation
and self-reporting. Little distinguishes these current deferral and
nonprosecution agreements except that they occur in criminal
cases where the stakes may be particularly high. These agreements
were often investigated in conjunction with agencies, negotiated in
conjunction with agency consent decrees, and then supervised by
independent monitors jointly appointed by the DOJ and agencies
and reporting to both. The nature of this interaction between
agency compliance regimes and the DOJ's emerging regime is an
important area for future study.
Second, federal efforts should be considered alongside efforts by
state Attorneys General to pursue similar goals using similar
methods. Although traditionally states-like the federal govern-
ment had been-were reluctant to enforce criminal laws against
" Compare Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to
Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44969, 76 SEC Docket 296
(Oct. 23, 2001), available at www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm (asking
among the factors informing SEC discretion, "[d]id the company adopt and ensure en-
forcement of new and more effective internal controls and procedures designed to pre-
vent a recurrence of the misconduct?") with Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson,
Deputy Attorney Gen., to the Heads of Department Components, United States Attor-
ney, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 1 (Jan. 20, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business-organizations.pdf, and Memorandum from Paul
J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Department Components, United
States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12,
2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf.
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corporations, Elliot Spitzer transformed the practice by leading ef-
forts to pursue structural reform, even crafting industry-wide
agreements. Others have followed suit, such as California Attorney
General Bill Lockyer and Massachusetts Secretary of State Wil-
liam Galvin.'4
Third, the Sentencing Guidelines emphasize compliance goals at
the penalty phase. A conviction can result in a similar remedy as
that in a settlement, where organizations may be required by courts
to create compliance programs as a condition of probation. Further
work could investigate how judges now apply those Guidelines.
Fourth, the role of outsiders-in particular, the compliance in-
dustry -will be a rich subject for future study. Former prosecutors
or regulators have often been appointed as independent monitors,
and were frequently active in the burgeoning compliance industry,
serving the needs of organizations under investigation or seeking to
head off potential scrutiny. Legal scholars should continue to ex-
plore the emerging influence and role of compliance experts.
Finally, the compliance industry has eager clients. Organizations
have themselves focused-in response to regulators, of course-on
compliance-oriented approaches. Many of the entities prosecuted
had already made significant structural changes once these entities
discovered the malfeasance. Bristol-Myers, for example, had al-
ready retained Judge Frederick B. Lacey, later appointed as an in-
dependent monitor, to conduct a review of its internal controls.
Pursuant to this review, it had made "significant personnel
changes" at the highest levels and had adopted a whole series of
other auditing and compliance measures.)5 In turn, organizations
may influence the nature of compliance demands. The political dy-
namics of such prosecutions are very different in a RICO prosecu-
tion than in a prosecution of a firm under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. Some cases have industry-wide effects and entire in-
dustries may lobby the executive branch or Congress; the DOJ has
already changed its approach regarding privilege waiver and em-
ployer payment of attorney's fees in response to pressure.
" See Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securi-
ties Enforcement, 11 Conn. Ins. L.J. 107, 115-21 (2004).
' Bristol-Myers Squibb Company Deferred Prosecution Agreement, June 15, 2005
at [ 5, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/deferredpros.pdf.
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The multi-polar nature of these negotiated dispositions has not
been sufficiently recognized. Whether the convergence in compli-
ance approaches represents path dependency or emerging best
practices in part depends on their efficacy. Future work will hope-
fully take on the very difficult task of assessing whether these ap-
proaches successfully prevent, detect, or remedy organizational
crime.
A Series of Reform Proposals
Taking as a given that organizational prosecutions will continue
for some time and that some kind of settlement option will remain
preferable for both prosecutors and for organizations, defining the
scope of those settlements and their terms is an important and un-
der-examined project. The DOJ has not yet made policy state-
ments regarding most structural reform aspects of the agreements.
Reforms have not even been suggested much less explored, per-
haps because these issues were drowned out by the political fray
over privilege waiver issues (and now over U.S. Attorney firings).
Structural reform prosecutions are so new that any next generation
approach, moderated by reforms and adjustments by all sides, may
be years away. It will be fascinating to see how future administra-
tions approach such prosecutions and then how regulators, indus-
try, and Congress react. A few possibilities for reform are outlined
below, not because they should necessarily be adopted but because
they suggest additional ways to think about structural reform
prosecutions.
First, severe collateral consequences of indictment in organiza-
tional cases could be decreased if the relevant agencies reinter-
preted debarment rules or if Congress legislated to modify those
regulatory consequences. Regulatory or legislative change to the
collateral consequences that organizations face would totally alter
the underlying bargaining relationship between corporations and
prosecutions. Reputational effects would remain, but the change
could, among other things, move the negotiations from the charg-
ing stage to the plea bargaining stage. That result would permit ad-
judication later in a case, with more court involvement and with
more information exchanged between the parties. The disadvan-
tages, however, include a reduced deterrent threat of indictment.
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A statute permitting a court to enjoin a prosecution if a prosecu-
tor arbitrarily or unjustifiably declares a breach of an agreement
would reduce the unilateral power that the terms of these agree-
ments provide prosecutors during their implementation. An arbi-
trary declaration of a breach would violate the organization's due
process rights, but courts are reluctant to enjoin an indictment.
Unless prosecutors no longer insist on such terms, legislation
would be necessary to prevent the possible harm of an improper
declaration of breach and indictment. Little attention has been
paid to the enormous leverage the provisions give prosecutors at
the termination stage, perhaps because prosecutors themselves
may have been wary of relying on those terms and risking the dire
consequences to an organization of finding a breach. Reforms
might give prosecutors less catastrophic means to address a partial
failure and therefore provide more appropriate tools to obtain the
sought after compliance. A discussion about how these agreements
terminate would also focus attention on how prosecutors should
make the ultimate decision in assessing whether compliance is fi-
nally obtained.
More broadly, the DOJ could issue guidelines explaining the
remedies it seeks in these agreements. All that the DOJ has done
thus far is include in the McNulty memo restrictions on securing
privilege waiver and nonpayment of employee legal fees. Though
prosecutors have informally imitated each other's agreements and
shared practices (perhaps simply cutting and pasting other agree-
ments, or perhaps with more consultation), there appears to be no
formalized assessment within the DOJ regarding what remedies
work best and which should be sought. The lack of collaboration
regarding organizational prosecution policy spilled into the press
recently with accusations that the rank and file within the DOJ
were not even consulted during deliberations regarding the impor-
tant McNulty Memo changes.16 The DOJ has adopted a structural
reform mission but appears not to be using its Corporate Crime
Task Force to evaluate that mission to assess whether the sought
after reforms are being achieved. Nor for that matter have any
regulatory agencies pursuing similar structural reform goals issued
public remedial guidelines.
" See David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, The Ousted Prosecutors; U.S. Prosecutors
Assail Gonzales in Closed Session, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 2007, at Al.
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Finally, during the implementation of these agreements, inde-
pendent monitors have not released their compliance reports, ap-
parently for confidentiality reasons. The DOJ does not appear to
be sharing this information internally or releasing general informa-
tion regarding how the compliance process has been conducted.
Without such information sharing, one cannot expect effective best
practices to evolve internally, nor can one expect the public (or le-
gal academics) to assess whether meaningful structural reform is
occurring.
To return to where I began: difficult practical and theoretical
problems of remedial design occur in any structural reform enter-
prise. They surface now in criminal law because the DOJ increas-
ingly confronts Goliath but not by securing an indictment or a con-
viction. The United States and Goliath instead negotiate and then
implement an ongoing project of structural reform. Structural re-
form prosecutions raise a series of complex questions and possibili-
ties, on which my colleagues who have generously agreed to com-
ment have shed more light. This prosecution approach warrants a
sustained effort by the DOJ, organizations, regulators, legislators,
courts, and scholars to assess which structural reforms effectively
address underlying criminality and to carefully consider their de-
sign. Hopefully our discussion and others yet to come can be of
some use both to the United States and Goliath.
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